Information Disclosure via Platform Endorsement in Online Healthcare

Information Disclosure via Platform Endorsement in Online Healthcare

Abstract: Platform endorsement is increasingly popular and plays a critical role in online healthcare platforms by aiding patient choices and shaping doctors' behaviors. Using a unique dataset from a major Chinese online consultation platform, we apply a generalized synthetic control method to examine the impact of endorsement on patient demand, doctor service pricing, service quantity, and quality. We find that endorsement significantly increases the price and quantity of paid services, while reducing free services among endorsed doctors. Despite handling higher service volumes, endorsed doctors maintain or improve quality. The program generates greater revenue for endorsed doctors and the platform, but raises concerns about equity in healthcare access due to reduced free service provision for underprivileged patients. We further find that the impact of endorsement varies between initial endorsement and re-endorsement, as well as between high-prosocial and low-prosocial doctors. These findings underscore the nuanced role of information disclosure in shaping doctor behavior and patient access, offering important implications for platform design.

Paper link: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4726380

More information on Xu Zhang can be found here

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